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I. Introduction
It is apparently a commonp lace nowadays that there is no significant
difference between natural Family Planning (NFP) and contracept ion
through artificial means such as the pilL condoms . intrauterine devices.
etc .; they are all methods for regulating conception. So w id tfS pread is this
assumption that. despite consistent magisterial teaching to the contrary .
it prevails even among Roman Catho lic s. - and not just among the
faithfuL where presumably the lack of a sophisticated moral sensibility
precludes the perception of subt le distinctions . but even among specialists
in moral thinking whose training would presumably equip them to
appreciate any ethically relevant differences between the two practices.
Indeed. the moral equiva lence of NFP and artificial contraception is so
plain to many Catholic moralists that they do not even bother to argue for
it; rather. it may simply be asserted . In the li ght of this prevalent opinion.
the official teaching of the Church seems rather unenlightened .
Numerous citations from Catholic moralists cou ld be adduced to
document this state of affa irs. For the purposes of thi s exposition.
however. it must suffice to consider as representative the influ entia l work
Human Sexualitr: Ne\\ ' DireClions in American Catho lic Thought by
Anthony Kosnik et al. The representative and derivative c haracter of the
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work on this issue is evidenced by its citation and endorsement of the
views of famous moralists like Charles Curran and Bernard Haring
(among others). The Kosnik book considers contraception within the
context of family planning and asserts: "Among the methods employed
for contraceptive purposes are: (I) complete abstinence, (2) rhythm , (3)
the birth control pill , (4) ovulation , (5) the progesterone pill ,(6)
intrauterine devices , (7) diaphragms , (8) condoms , (9) basal temperature ,
(10) spermicides, (II) withdrawal, (12) the DES morning-after pill, (13)
sterilization. " I
They are all methods of contraception , which itself is equated with
family planning. Now the work recognizes that some moral distinctions
need to be made between the various method s, based primarily on their
impact upon the well-being of the persons involved , but such distinctions
serve to dissolve rather than maintain the alleged moral difference
between NFP and artificial birth control. Periodic continence is simp ly
one form of family planning or contraception whose "natural" quality
does not invest it with a moral superiority over "artificial" methods ; to
assert otherwise is to betray an excessively biological understanding of
the natural law. Thus , iffamily planning can be licit (all would agree that
this is so) , then so too are the va rious contraceptive measures which can
pass muster according to newer personal norms (as opposed to the
old-fashioned physiological norms of the natural law).
In the face of this widespread moral consensus, the words of Pope John
Paul II in Familiaris Consorlio appear strange indeed : "It [the difference
between contraception and the use of the rhythm of the cycle] is a
difference which is much wider and deeper than is usually thought , one
which involves in the final analysis {WO irreconcilable concep{s 0/ {he
human person and o/human sexuali{.1'."2 Moreover, he goes on to assert
that those who contracept commit an evil act which manipulates and
degrades human sexuality, while those who legitimately regu late births
through NFP, achieve human love at its deepest level. The strong claim
made here, which is fully substantiated in other ' writings, directly
contradicts the popular tendency to conflate NFP and artificial birth
control. And like those who oppose the Church's position. the Pope also
appeals to a personalistic norm. Is the papal position a hyperbolic
attempt to buttress an outmoded teaching? Or is it rather the longawaited and much needed articulation of the profoundest meaning of the
Church's tradition?
The opinion of John Paul II cannot be reconciled with the opinion of
the many. One must be true while the other must be false . Either Kosnik e{
al or John Paul II is correct. Therefore it will be the purpose of thi s paper
to advance a resolution of the dispute on the basis of a careful
philosophical analysis of the issue . The two positions shall be considered
analytically without appeal being made to the unique character of papal
teaching authority. 3 The first question to .be considered is whether there is
a significant difference between artificial birth control and N FP when
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they are considered as human acti o ns. In other words, does the
introd uction of a contraceptive device change the character of coition so
as to ma ke it a different kind of act from intercourse which does not
involve such an intervention ? Secondly, if this is found to be the case , then
what is the moral significance of the difference? Finally, if there is a moral
discrepancy between the two forms of birth regulation , then what is
implied about the corresponding perspectives on the human person and
human sexuality?

II. The Difference Between Contraceptive Intercourse
and Non-contraceptive Intercourse 4
Th e question at issue here is the difference between sexual intercourse
which involves the use of contraception and intercourse which does not
involve contraception . The focus will be on the particular performance of
the conjugal act. This insistence is necessary at the outset because the
discussion is often muddled by the failure to distinguish between
ind ividual acts of contraceptive intercourse and the pattern or attitude of
the spouses as a whole. This confusion is fostered by those who would like
to redefine contraception as a mentality or disposition marking the
marriage as a whole. rather than something which refers primarily and
properly to individual acts of intercourse. s Both aspects of the situation .
the individual act and the overall att itude. are relevant to the moral
assessment of the action. Yet these two aspects must be kept separate in
order to understand and then evaluate the deed. It is necessary to consider
the action first qua individual action and then qua part of an established
pattern of action.
What distinguishes an act of contraceptive intercourse from an act of
non-contraceptive intercourse is that the former involves the choice to do
something before. during. or after the act which destroys the possibility of
conception precisely because it is believed that such a choice will indeed
negate the possibility of conception." In other words. contraception
involves the execut ion of a choice to exclude concepti e, n from an act
which by nature involves that possibility. Normal sexual intercourse is an
intrinsically generative kind of act; one contracepts because conception is
considered to be an unacceptable possibility here and now. The choice to
exclude conception or to contracept may manifest itself in a physical
transformation of the act of coition into one which is intrinsically antigenerative because of the influence of chemical or mechanical agents . It is
more usual . however, for contraception to be accomplished by something
which involves no physical distortion of the act (e.g. the pill). 7 This means
that qua physical act. contraception may be an intrinsically generative
kind of act. Yet qua intentional act . or qua act of an intelligent and
deliberative human agent. all acts of contraceptive intercourse are antigenerative kinds of acts .
The key to the entire discussion . as Anscombe clearly demonstrates. is
a proper understanding of intention:
50
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The reason why people are confused about intention , and why they
sometimes think there is no difference between contraceptive intercourse and
the use of infertile times to avoid conception, is thi s: They don't notice the
difference between "intention" when it means the intentionalness of the thing
you're doing- that you're doing this on purpose - and when it means a
further or accompany ing intention with which yo u do the thing
Contraceptive intercourse and interco urse using infertile times may be alike
in respect of further intention, and these further intentions may be good ,
justified , excellent
But contraceptive intercourse is faulted, not on
account of this further intention , but because of the kind of intentional action
yo u are doing. The action is not left by you as the kind of act by which life is
transmitted , but is purposely rendered infertile, and so changed to another
sort of act altogether. 8

Distinction Between Intentions
With this distinction between the intention with which something is
done and the further or accompanying intention (that for the sake of
which) , it is easy to see what the precise difference is between
contraceptive intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse. Both may
have the same further intention. But there is clear difference between their
respective present intentions , the intentions inherent in the action that is
now being performed apart from any accompanying intentions which
mayor may not be present. The act of contraception embodies the
intention of avoiding conception and so makes the coital act a different
kind of act (anti-generative) from that which would result if that intention
were not operative. Moreover, the intention embodied in the action is a
cause or part-cause of the infertility of the act; the further circumstances
which determine the fertility of the act (since not every intrinsically
generative kind of act is , in fact, fertile) include the intention as a cause. 9
Non-contraceptive intercourse reveals a different structure. It is an
intrinsically generative kind of act both physically and intentionally.
There may be a further intention to avoid conception (as could be the case
in NFP), but the act itself does not embody the presenJ intention to avoid
conception as is the case when there is interference by artificial birth
control. The further intention to avoid conception does not cause
infertility since the act is found to be infertile on its own . The intention to
avoid conception is manifested in the determination to avoid intercourse
during the woman's fertile period, but this choice does nothing to the
sexual intercourse that is chosen during infertile periods to render it
anti-generative. Moreover, it should be noted that the choice not to
contracept, even when no conception is desired , reveals a fundamentally
different attitude toward the procreative aspect of the conjugal act (which
will be important in the moral evaluation of the act).
Thus it is the case that contraception purposely transforms intercourse
into a different kind of act altogether:
In contraceptive intercourse the intentional action is deliberately altered
from being a generative kind of action to being an act of attaining sexual
clima x. This account of what the intentional act here is ought. I think, to be
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accepted , wh ethe r we approve of such an act or not. For it is not a question of
the further purpose or intention with which the act is done-to fost er the
well-being of th e pa rents , sustain their love , etc., -but of what th e intentiona l
act itself is: nam ely, the couple's use o f one anothe r's bodies , no lon ge r to
perform a genera tive type of act. but for one or both to achieve orga sm. IO

Let it be noted that the essential difference between contraceptive
intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse is located in the
intentional structure of the act qua human act ; the issue is in no way
determined by mere biological or physical factors. Having thus isolated
the relevant difference as lying in the embodied intention of contraceptive
intercourse to negate the procreative aspect of the act and so transform its
character, it remains now to evaluate the moral significance of that
difference.
III. The Morality of Negating the
Procreative Aspect of the Conjugal Act

In order to maintain clarity offocus, it must be understood that what
precisely is at issue here is the moral difference between contraceptive
intercourse and non-contraceptive intercourse as they have been defined
in the preceding analysis . What is not at issue is the legitimacy of
intelligent family planning, which the Church recognizes and condones. 11
For the purposes of the present analysis , the further or surrounding
intentions will be presumed upright in both cases; that is , it is assumed
that the issue is truly family planning and not the complete avoidance of
conception which would be condemnable regardless of how it was
achieved because it violates the intrinsic meaning of the marital union Y
Nor is extra-marital intercourse at issue here, although the moral
resolution of contraception in general will affect the evaluation of every
act of intercourse . By eliminating these other morally relevant features of
the action (the finis and the circumstances) from the present
consideration, it is possible to focus squarely on the crucial question of
the morality of intending here and now to negate the procr~ative aspect of
the conjugal act. For if contraception is condemnable, it is so precisely
because it embodies an intention to avoid generation which makes the
sexual act a different kind of act regardless of any further intentions.
The moral evaluation can be distinguished into two separate but
related questions. The first concerns the morality of the anti-procreative
intention embodied in the contraceptive act , while the second concerns
the morality of the resulting new kind of action . With regard to the first
concern, it is often argued that contraception is wrong because it
constitutes an illicit interference into the course of nature. Yet this
argument is inadequate insofar as it fails to make clear what makes this
form of interference condemnable when other form s of interference (e .g ..
medical procedures) are licit and even la udable. Anscombe's treatment of
the issue is incomplete; she correctly identifies the question without
dissecting it with her usual clarityU She observes' that by direc tly
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excluding procreation , contraception deprives sexual intercourse of that
which is universally recognized (by a "mystical perception") to be what
makes it profoundly significant and indeed unique among all human
activities (witness the association of sexuality with shame). The result of
this deprivation is a trivialization and degradation of intercourse into
something done casually for the sake of sensual gratification. Yet while
Anscombe's intuition on this count is surely true, it is still necessary to say
more concerning the impropriety of this kind of tampering with natural
processes.

Inseparable Dimensions
This brings the discussion directly to the central issue of the
inseparability of the unitive and procreative dimensions of sexual
intercourse. 14 Why is this natural connection inviolable? The question
cannot be satisfactorily settled as long as the connection is seen as a mere
biological datum of an impersonal order of nature. According to this
perspective , the connection stands mqnipulatable to human technology
like other processes of nature which man masters in order to serve his own
ends (sometimes for weal and sometimes for woe) . No, the connection
must be seen to reflect the will of the personal Creator wherein He
safeguards and promotes the highest values of created existence. IS
Observation of the natural law then becomes the means to the authentic
realization of the human person and not slavish devotion to biology. It is a
matter of justice to the Creator not as a nominalist promulgator ofjial, but
rather as Wisdom itself ordering all things to their proper ends. The
assertion being made here is that, contrary to the claims of its proponents ,
contraception does not promote the true values of the human person, but
instead degrades and contemns them. How this is so will be made clear
during the analysis of the second question concerning the new act which
results from a contraceptive intent.
Yet before considering this second question , it must
noted that there
exists another perspective from which to evaluate the choice to contracept:
as a direct attack upon one of the basic goods of human nature. This line of
reasoning has been developed by Germain Grisez and others as part of a
natural law argument against contraception. 16 The starting point for the
argument is the recognition that among the basic goods constitutive of
human flourishing is the good of procreation (separate from the good of
life itself) which encompasses the total bringing into being and nurturing
of a new human person. If this is the case , (and both reason and revelation
testify that procreation is indeed a basic human good), then what attitude
ought we have with regard to it? Now clearly, those who support
contraception must take the position that it is permissible under some
conditions to act directly against a basic human good because
contraception has already been shown to entail an embodied intention to
negate procreation. Therefore, those who defend contraception must
argue according to proportionalist principles whereby one may

pe
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legitimately act against a basic good in order to bring about some other
good(s); in this case the argument would be that one may assail the good of
procreation for the sake of the unitive good. 17 Any methodology which
allows for the direct commission of evil acts, however, is seriously d efective
philosophically and theologically. IX The proper attitude toward basic
human goods is that articulated by Grisez:
The good ma n need not purs ue eve ry possible good - in fact. he cannot do so.
But he mu st avoid direct ly violating any of the fundamental goods. Thus somc
kinds of acts are intrinsicall y immoral. for somc kinds of acts nccc ssaril y
include in themselves a turning against so m e basic good. an avcrsion which
also inevitabl y implies an aversion from Goodness Itse lf. This sta ndard is a
dynamic and existentia l o ne. What is require d for the goodness ofa human act
is not that it have the best possible consequences. but that it proceed from a
trul y good will. a hea rt be nt upon all the human goods as the imagcs of
Goodness It se lf. Such a moral standard alone befits the dignity and freedom
of man.'·

Therefore contraceptive intercourse is wrong because the direct violation
of a basic human good is inco mpatible with the achievement of moral
excellence.

Escape from Justice
\( is important to understand why NFP intercourse escapes the above
judgment. The earlier intentional analysis makes this an easy task. While
the further intentions of those who contracept and those who do not ma y
be the same, their present intentions are quite different. The present
intentions of those engaging in NFP do not embody the decision to act
directly against the possibility of conception. The choice to forego
intercourse when it is believed to be potentially procreative in nowise
represents a repudiation of the good of procreation . One does not act
against a good simply by not intending it here and now. Indeed. abstinence
represents a respectful valuing of the good since it is chosen precisely
because procreation cannot be legitimately negated. To be s~re. those who
engage in NFP for legitimate reasons are not pursuing the good of
procreation when the y choose to have intercourse only during infertile
periods. As Grisez notes above, however , it is not necessary to pursue all
the human goods at once; but it is required that one not act directl y against
any of the basic goods in the course of pursui ng another good. Thus while
NFP intercourse ma y be non-procreative by virtue of its further
intentions. it is ne ver directly anti-procreative like contraceptive
intercourse. Therein lies perhaps the most important moral difference.
\( remains now to consider the morality of the new sexual act brought
into being by the intention to contracept. As was established earlier.
contraception transforms intercourse from a generative kind of action
(and so a true marital act) into an act of attaining sexual climax through
the use of one another's bodies (an ersatz marital act). ]O Does this negation
of the procreative aspect truly serve the unitive perso nal dimension of
sexuality as the defenders of contraception claim'l Or are the two aspects of
54
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cOitIOn so inextricably intertwined that to negate the procreative
dimension is to vitiate the unitive dimension? The truth of the latter
position has been convincingly articulated by John Paul II , especially in a
work which he authored prior to assuming the papacy entitled Love and

Responsibility.2 1
The fundamental moral principle of Love and Responsibility is the
personalistic norm:
This norm , in its negative aspect, states that the person is the kind of good which
does not admit of use and cannot be trea ted as an object of use and as such the
means to an end. In its positive form the personalist ic norm confirms this: the
perso n is a good toward which the on ly proper and adequate attitude is love. The
positive content of the perso nalistic norm is precisely what the commandment to
love teaches ."

Within the context of marriage as the lasting union of persons involving
the possibility of procreation , sexual relations are evaluated according to
this norm as the safeguard against utilitarianism (treating the person as an
object) . The inseparability of the unitive and procreative aspects of the
marital act is predicted upon this principle . Contraception violates the
principle.
The proper way for a person to deal with his or her sexuality is to
recognize that the inner dynamism of the sexual act toward procreation is
the indispensable condition for the realization of love between persons.
The latter must respect the inner logic of the former in order to be
authentic. This means that the mutual acceptance of procreation and the
possibility of parenthood are necessary for the sexual union to be truly
personal union: "Neither in the man nor in the woman can affirmation of
the value of the person be divorced from awareness and willing acceptance
that he may become a father and that she may become a mother."23 True
personal love demands both the conscious acceptance of the other as a
potential parent and the conscious donation of the self as a potential
parent.

Exclusion of Possible Parenthood
If the possibility of parenthood is deliberately excluded from marital
relations by contraception, then the character of the relationship changes
radically. The transformation is from a relationship of authentic personal
love toward a utilitarian relationship of mutual enjoyment which is
incompatible with the personalistic norm. Instead of regarding the spouse
as a potential co-creator in love of another person, the other becomes a
partner in an erotic experience. In this case, the erotic urges degrade the
relationship of love by negating the true value of persons in favor of
mutual sensual satisfaction divorced from total reciprocal self-donation.
By violating the natural dynamism toward procreation , which is a
constitutive feature of the sexual act, one exploits the other by making him
or her into something less than a person (i.e ., an object for enjoyment) .
And by succumbing to sexual urges in this way, rather than mastering
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them in the service of authentic persona l love , the agent acts in a less than
personal way himself.2 4

IV. The Ultimate Distinction Between Contraception and NFP
Having established the philosophical diffe rence between contraceptive
interco urse a nd non-contraceptive intercourse and having shown that the
form er is intrinsically immoral becau se it constitutes a direct assault upon
the procreative good which is creatively inscribed with the unitive good at
the hea rt of human sexuality in order to promote the good of the person ,
the essay can now conclude with a consideration of the implications of
these finding s for an understanding of the human person and human
sexuality. It should be possible now to discern the full import of the
previously quoted words of John Paul II in Familiaris Consonio: " It is a
diffe rence [between contraception and recourse to the rh ythm of the cycle]
which is much wider and dee per than is usuall y thought , one which
invo lves in the final analysis two irreconcilable concepts of the human
person and human sex uality.'
With rega rd to the practice of contraception, the Pope notes: "When
couples, by means of recourse to contraception, separate these two
meanings that God the Creator has insc ribed in the being of man and
woman and in the dynamism of their sexual communion, the y act as
'arbiters' of the divine plan and they ' manipulate' and degrade human
sexuality and with it themselves and their married partner by altering its
value of 'total' se lf-giving."25 The severance of the procreative and the
unitive dimension s of the conjugal act manifests more than a dubious
intervention into nature or even an impious dis res pect for the work of the
Creator. Ra ther. it represe nts a contemning of the infinite value of the
human perso n, through exploitation for pleasure. in the very context
(marriage) wherein reverence and lo ve for that va lue are meant to find
their ultimate ex press ion. Sexual acts which deliberatel y negate the
possibilit y of parenthood cannot lay claim to the description of mutua l
self-donation: "Thus the innate language that expresses the t ~ tal reciprocal
self-giving of husband and wife is overlaid. through contraception. by a n
objectively contradictory language , namel y, that of not giving oneself
totally to the other."2h
This lead s to the question of the true meaning of the "language of the
bod y", a t o pic upon which John Pa ul II has expressed profound
considerations. Richard Hogan summarizes so me central features of the
Pope's thou g ht as follows:
If the body (e ithe r male or female) is the expression ofa hu man person. then the
g ift ofa man and a woma n to o ne a n other is indeed the g ift of t wo persons to o ne
a not her. As the body is the sacrament of a pe rson. so th e physical gift of a ma n
a nd a woman is the ou tward sig n. the sac ram e nt. of a ('{IIII/ Ill/lliOIl o('pe l'so ll s.
And this sacramen t is a shadow o r reflec ti on of th e com munion of the three
pe rsons of the bl essed Trinit y. The body. the n. is the means and the sign of th e gift
o f th e man-pe rso n to th e femal e-perso n. The H o ly Fa the r ca ll s this capacity o f th e
bod y to ex press lo ve th e IIlI/Jlia/llleallillg 0('1/11' hod ..."
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Men and women are therefore called to express the language of their
bodies in all the truth that is proper to it as the authentic revelation and
sacrament of the human person. According to the objective truth of this
language, the conjugal act signifies both love and potential fecundity such
that to deprive it of the latter is also to deprive it of the former. Therefore
the Pope concludes:
It can be said that in the case of an artificial separation of these two aspects, there
is carried out in the conjugal act a real bodily union , but it does not correspond to
the interior truth and to the dignity of personal communion: communion of
persons. This communion demands in fact that the 'language of the body' be
expressed reciproca lly in the integral truth of its meaning. If this truth be lacking,
one cannot speak either ofthe truth of self-mastery, or of the reciprocal gift and of
the reciprocal acceptance of self on the part of the other person. Such a violation
of the interior order of conjugal union. which is rooted in the very order of the
person , constitutes the essential evil of the contraceptive act. 28

Those who admit the licitness of contraceptive intercourse obviously
cannot accept an anthropology which so intimately connects the spiritual
and the corporeal within the unity of the person. In order to legitimate the
choice to negate the procreative dimension of sexual intercourse, they
must regard that dimension as essentially subordinate to and separate
from the relational or unitive dimension of sexuality; the latter belongs
intrinsically to the personal order, while the former mayor may not,
depending upon whether it is consciously assumed and chosen by the
subject,29 By itself, the procreative dimension belongs to the biological or
sub-personal order (where it becomes "reproduction"). Thus the
contraceptive position depends upon a dualist anthropology and its
concomitant separatist view of sexuality which are objectionable on both
philosophical and theological grounds. 3o There is also a deep irony
involved in this position because the proponents of contraception
normally accuse the ,Church's teaching of reflecting "physicalism": "The
truth is that tlie advocates of contraception are guilty of physicalism, for
they reduce the human body and the human , personal power of giving life
to a new person to mere material instruments meant to serve consciously
experienced goods, which for them are the 'higher' goods of human
existence."3I
In contrast to the dualist anthropology and separatist understanding of
sexuality which undergirds the contraceptive position, the foundations of
those who promote NFP are personalist and integralist, along the lines laid
down by John Paul II. To regulate births by reading the language of the
body in truth is a ministration of God's plan which respects the good of the
other by respecting the natural dynamism of the marital act toward true
self-giving. As John Paul notes, NFP provides an entirely different context
for the communion of persons which is marriage:
The choice of the natural rhythms involves accepting the cycle of the person . that
is. the woman. and thereby accepting the dialogu e. reciprocal respect. shared
responsibilit y and self-control. To accept the cycle and to enter into dialogue
means to recogni ze both the spiritual and corporal character of conjugal
communion and to live personal lo ve with its requirement of fidelit y. )2

February, 1987

57

In order to practice NFP as this kind of communio personarum , mere
empirical knowledge of the cycle offertility is insufficient. Rather, what is
required is virtuous self-mastery or the "capacity to direct the sensual and
emotive reactions [so] as to make possible the giving of self to the other 'I'
on the grounds of mature self-possession of one's own 'I' in its corporeal
and emotive subjectivity."33 The sexual urge must be mastered so as to
resist any tendencies to degrade the relationship to where it expresses
something other than personal love. NFP is based on the virtue of
continence or marital chastity not simply because of the requirement of
periodic abstinence, but rather because it is only by mature self-possession
of one's psychosomatic subjectivity that the sexual union truly becomes a
personal union. The virtue of marital chastity is not a priggish "refraining
from", but rather a positive "capacity for" ; it does not detract from
personal love, but rather enhances it. Personal love and chastity are
inseparable. John Paul summarizes this beautifully as follows:
If conjugal chastity (and cha stit y in general) is manifested at first as the capacity
to resist the concupiscence of th e flesh. it later gradually reveals itself as a singular
capacit y to perceive. love and practice those meanings of the 'language of the
bod y' which rema in altogether unknown to concupiscence it se lf and which
progressively enrich the marital dialogue of the couple . purifying it. deepening it .
and at the same time simplifying it. Therefore. that asceticism of continence. of
whic h the encyclical speaks (Humanae Virae. n.2I) . does not impoverish
'affective manifestations.' but rather makes them spiritually more intense and
therefo re enriches them H

By now it should be plain that contraception and NFP are not two equal
"methods" to the same end as suggested by Kosnik et al. It would be better
to categorize them as representing two radically different approaches to
the human person and human sexuality or as two competing "theologies of
the body" . Both style themselves as serving the authentic values of the
human person as created in the image and likeness of God. Yet both
cannot be true; their opposition is too great. If the preceding analysis is
accurate, then the judgment concerning their relative meli ts should prove
to be relatively easy. The view which recognizes the critical moral
importance of the intentional structure of human action and the authentic
meaning of personal love is the view which ought to compel assent. That
such a view is the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church is
perhaps no accident. Yet in the final analysis , the grounds for submitting
to it are nothing other than the grounds of truth itself.
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